Gibbard-Satterthwaite and an Arrovian Connection
Eivind Stensholt Abstract A very close link of G-S, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem to Arrow's "impossibility" theorem is shown. G-S is derived as a corollary: from a strategy-proof singleseat election method F is constructed an election method G that contradicts Arrow's theorem.
Assumptions F is a preferential election method for v voters and n candidates, n>2: R = F( ) where R is the social preference relation determined by the profile = (R 1 , ..., R v ) and R i is the ballot preference relation of voter i. Let P and P i , I and I i be the relations of strict preference and indifference associated with R and R i . Assume that
each R i is freely chosen as one of the n! linear orderings of the candidates ;
(ii) there are two I-classes, a singleton class with the unique F-winner W and the rest ;
(iii) for every candidate X there are profiles so that X = W ;
(iv) F is nondictatorial in the sense that no fixed d has W top-ranked in R d for all .
Theorem (Gibbard 1973 , Satterthwaite 1975 ) F is not strategy-proof.
This means that i and = (R 1 , ..., R i , ..., R v ) exist so that i's preference as expressed by R i is better served by another relation R' i and profile ' = (R 1 , ..., R' i , ..., R v ), thus W ' P i W The switch from R i to R' i is a strategic vote for i. The following proof by contradiction constructs another voting method G so that Q=G( ) would be linear with the same winner as R=F( ) 1 .
Proof: Assume F is strategy-proof. Choose by (iii) profiles and so that W W . Change the profile stepwise from to , one voter switching at a time, and pick a step from to ' where voter i by switching from R i to R' i causes a change: W W ' . Consider 3 possibilities:
1. The proof has 2 steps similar to that of Schmeidler and Sonnenschein (1978) , with a more powerful conclusion (*) to step 1 and a simpler G in step 2. ≠ ≠ (a) W P i W and W P i 'W ; (b) W P i W and W P i 'W ; (c) W P i W and W P i 'W .
The switch from (a) R i to R' i ; (b) R' i back to R i ; (c) R i to R' i is a strategic vote for i. Hence W P i W and W P i 'W . Thus, to get rid of the F-winner W , (*) at least one i must switch from W P i X to XP' i W for some X, i.e. let X overtake W . [Raise A and any X to the top two places in every ballot so that none of the two passes the other.
Nobody overtakes A in any ballot, thus A remains F-winner and AQX.] C4: Q is linear, i.e. reflexive, complete and antisymmetric.
[Apply the definition of Q and C2 with r=2.] C5: G is IIA, "independent of irrelevant alternatives" (Arrow 1963) .
[Apply the definition of Q and C2 with r=2. Rearranging ballot positions 3, ..., n will not change the F-winner. The partition {i: AP i B}U{i: BP i A} of the voter set determines if AQB or BQA.] C6: Q=G( ) is transitive.
1. For intuitive understanding, say that "F and give A an advantage over B" when AQB.
